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ABSTRACT 
 
The application of machine learning  to bioinformatics problems is well established. Less well understood 
is the application of bioinformatics techniques to machine learning and, in particular, the representation of  
non-biological data as biosequences. The aim of this paper is to explore the effects of giving amino acid 
representation to problematic machine learning data and to evaluate the benefits of supplementing 
traditional machine learning with bioinformatics tools and techniques. The signatures of 60 computer 
viruses and 60 computer worms were converted into amino acid  representations and first multiply 
aligned separately to identify conserved regions across different families within each class (virus and 
worm). This was followed by a second alignment of all 120 aligned signatures together so that non-
conserved regions were identified prior to input to a number of machine learning techniques. Differences 
in length between virus and worm signatures after the first alignment were resolved by the second 
alignment. Our first set of experiments indicates that representing computer malware signatures as amino 
acid sequences followed by alignment leads to greater classification and prediction accuracy. Our second 
set of experiments indicates that checking the results of data mining from artificial virus and worm data 
against known proteins can lead to generalizations being made from the domain of naturally occurring 
proteins to malware signatures.  However, further work is needed to determine the advantages and 
disadvantages of different representations and sequence alignment methods for handling problematic 
machine learning data.  
 
All data, machine learning and biological tools used in this paper are publicly available and free. 
Computer malware signatures were downloaded from VX heavens: www.vxheavens.com. The multiple 
sequence alignment techniques were ClustalW and T-Coffee from EBI: 
www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/msa/tcoffee. Various data mining functions within Weka (Waikato Environment for 
Knowledge Analysis) were used for machine learning  involving cross-validation, rule extraction and 
classification: www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka. Biological match of consensuses and meta-signatures was 
checked through the PRINTS database available via Motif3D at the University of Manchester 
http://www.bioinf.manchester.ac.uk/dbbrowser/motif3d/motif3d.html and FingerPRINTScan at the EBI 
(http address above).  QUARK and the Protein Data Bank were used for consensus modeling and protein 
matching:  zhanglab.ccmb.med.umich.edu/QUARK/  and www.pdb.org/pdb/home/home.do,  
respectively. The National Centre for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) was used for checking the 
biological function of matched proteins: ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/. The commercial package SPSS v19 was used 
for statistical analysis of alignment lengths and accuracy results by T tests and analysis of variance. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Such is the growth of malware (the generic term given to any program or code intended to cause 
disruption or gain access to unauthorised information and resources) that Symantec reported over 
3 billion malware attacks in 2010, with 93% increase in web attacks (Symantic Internet Security 
Threat Report, 2011). The traditional method for dealing with viruses and worms (two of the 
most common types of malware) is to use anti-viral software (AVS) that looks for ‘signatures’ 
which represent critical parts of executable code in numerical form. Whereas a virus requires 
some action to be propagated, such as being attached to a program by the user, a worm can 
propagate by itself. The aim of virus and worm writers is usually to cause some damage to 
computer systems, hence the term ‘malware’.  
 
Signatures can be calculated from a pattern of operations in the malware code or can represent 
the encryption algorithm used to hide the virus or worm.  Signatures were originally and 
continue to be identified and calculated by human experts, and are typically a sequence of 
hexadecimal numbers intended to uniquely identify viruses and worms. Automatic generation of 
signatures for new malware continues to be a difficult problem (Tang and Chen, 2008). Such 
signatures can also be consistent for a ‘family’ of viruses or worms that share parts of the code or 
have similar function and are essentially variants of each other. For instance, 
‘Virus.Acad.Bursted.a’ is a typical computer virus name that indicates the platform (Autocad, or 
‘Acad’), the family (Bursted) and the variant ‘a’. Achieving consistency of signatures for 
members of the same family is especially important when dealing with polymorphic (the 
functional parts of the code are the same but hidden differently) and metamorphic (the function 
remains the same but the code is altered with every replication) malware designed to avoid such 
signature detection (Szor, 2005; Parikka, 2007). Due to the security dangers inherent in making 
the original malware code available for public dissemination, only signatures are made publicly 
available. 
 
AVS scanners use a dictionary or library of signatures in a variety of different ways. For 
instance, for simple polymorphic malware detection the hexadecimal representation of a 
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signature can be used to match against incoming network packets containing bytes also 
represented in hexadecimal. This allows the AVS to check for contiguous similarities between 
parts of the signature and packet contents. For metamorphic and more complex polymorphic 
malware detection, increasingly sophisticated techniques must be used that allow for contiguous 
parts of the signature to be detected non-contiguously across different packets (Bayoglu and 
Sogukpinar, 2008). Signature detection through pattern matching is usually supported by other 
techniques, such as stateful monitoring, to minimize false positives and false negatives (Chen, 
2004).  
 
Malware writers adopt a variety of sophisticated techniques for avoiding detection. By the time a 
new variant is identified and signatures released, the infection may already have reached 
epidemic proportions (Strickland, 2011). One of the problems in applying automatic data mining 
techniques to malware code directly, even if it is available, is the variable length of the code 
(Xinguang et al., 2009), since most data mining and other machine learning techniques assume 
fixed length sequences with a column representing measurements of the same variable across 
many samples. There is surprisingly little work reporting on the application of machine learning 
techniques to malware signature detection, mainly due to the problem of obtaining malware 
source code  as well as the need to deal with variable length code to identify the critical parts of 
the code from which to derive signatures. The little work that exists in machine learning focuses 
on anomalous behavior detection (e.g. Rieck et al., 2008; Singhal and Raul, 2012) rather than 
code or signature analysis. Also, mining the signatures directly can lead to results that are 
difficult to interpret, since the hexadecimal signatures cannot always be mapped back to 
meaningful and individual operations in the source code (op code). The variable length of the 
malware code, the difficulty of legally obtaining source malware code for detailed analysis,  the 
lack of interpretability of results if hexadecimal signatures are used and the partially sequential 
aspects of the data all obstruct the use of machine learning techniques, thereby limiting their use 
in the urgent problem of finding automatic ways of generating signatures.   
 
In bioinformatics, sequence analysis is used to understand the relationship between two (pairwise 
alignment) or more (multiple sequence alignment) sequences of genetic information, such as 
DNA or amino acids (Mount, 2001). In particular, sequence analysis and alignment can be used 
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to identify conserved regions or motifs (regions of similarity) in biological data that identify 
common genes and shared ancestry as well as shed light on structure and function (Needleman 
and Wunsch, 1970; Smith and Waterman, 1981). Sequence alignment techniques are not 
confined to biological sequences and there have been applications of sequence alignment in 
linguistics (Kondrak, 2002) and marketing (Prinzie and Van den Poel, 2006). The first 
demonstration of the use of alignment for detecting computer viruses was reported in 2007 
(McGhee, 2007) and used profile hidden Markov models (Eddy, 1998) constructed from position 
specific information for scoring. However, only a subset of possible op codes was used for 
alignment, resulting in the exclusion of many viral op codes deemed not important. Also, the 
HMM worked not on a biological representation of the op codes but on an alphabet that was 
neither DNA nor amino acid.  
 
Earlier work (Chen et al., 2012a; Chen et al., 2012b) reported that traditional symbolic data 
mining (RIPPER (Cohen, 1995) and C4.5 (Quinlan, 1986)) in Weka (known as JRip and J48, 
respectively) had returned 60% accuracy using 10-fold cross-validation on 60 signatures (30 
virus, 30 worm) without alignment. This confirmed the problematic nature of signature analysis. 
After conversion to amino acid representation followed by standard multiple alignment, 
classification accuracy increased significantly, allowing hexadecimal meta-signatures to be 
extracted for distinguishing virus from worm signatures. But only one amino acid representation 
of signatures was tried and only one alignment method chosen. Also, only a couple of machine 
learning techniques were tried. This leads to questions about the reliability of earlier results and 
the applicability of the methods for larger sample sets.  One of the aims of this paper is to double  
the number of signatures and to explore the implications of adopting different predefined 
substitution matrices alongside two different alignment techniques with three different residue 
representations. Another aim is to increase the variety of machine learning tools for evaluating 
the effects of different representation on classification and prediction from two to five.  
 
It was not possible to attach meaning to the previously extracted meta-signatures (Chen et al., 
2012a; Chen et al., 2012b), since the original op code that gave rise to the signatures was not 
available. As we shall see, the preserved or conserved results of alignment (i.e. the consensus 
sequence of letters that are similar across sequences) can be given biological realization through 
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protein modeling to help in the evaluation of different representations as well as provide some 
interpretability of the results. Such biological realizations could provide new, biologically 
inspired ways of looking at malware signatures for future AV dictionaries to use.  
 
While the application of machine learning techniques (e.g. neural networks, genetic algorithms, 
rule extractors) in bioinformatics is well established (e,g, Baldi and Brunak, 2001; Keedwell and 
Narayanan, 2005), there is less understanding of how bioinformatics techniques can be applied to 
machine learning, especially when the data being mined is problematic from a machine learning 
perspective. The paper contains two sets of systems and methods and therefore two sets of 
results. Standard alignment methods and machine learning techniques are applied to data 
represented as biosequences in the first set of systems, methods and results. Standard 
bioinformatics protein database searching and protein modeling techniques are applied in the 
second. The combined results will lead to a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
treating machine learning data as amino acid sequences.   
 
To summarize, the research issues being addressed in this paper are: (a) the reliability of 
representing problematic data as biosequences followed by alignment and machine learning; and 
(b) the interpretability of the results. An overview of our research methods (more details in 
Sections 2 and 4) is as follows: 
1. Represent the two classes of data (virus and worm signatures) in amino acids. 
2. For each class, align the sequences using an appropriate method and substitution matrix 
(result is variable length samples in each class). 
3. Represent the gaps with an amino acid. 
4. Align all samples of all classes together (result is fixed length, and longer, sequences). 
5. Apply machine learning (ML) techniques and compare with machine learning results 
using the original, unaligned data. 
6. Extract rules. 
7. Check the sequences from step 2 against naturally occurring proteins. 
8. Check the consensuses from step 2 against naturally occurring proteins and give them 
biological realization. 
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9. Give the rules extracted at step 6 a biological realization and check against naturally occurring 
proteins.  
Section 2 deals with steps 1-6 and Section 4 with steps 7-9. 
 
2 SYSTEMS AND METHODS 1 
Viruses and worms can be written in any programming language before being compiled. Source 
code will not be used in this paper. Instead, in line with malware signature detection, the 
signatures of viruses and worms, expressed in hexadecimal, are used in the experiments below. 
For instance, the first part of the virus.1C.Tanga.a computer virus signature is 8e5ef1aec9125; 
the first part of worm Bat.Agent.bo is  fb56373bde388. The hexadecimal signatures for 60 
viruses and 60 worms were downloaded from VX Heavens.  
 
Table 1: Three different representations (R1-R3) of hexadecimal code (bold) in amino acid (residue) alphabet 
  
Hex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
R1 A C D E F G H I K 
R2 S R Q P N M L K I 
R3 A D E F G H I K L 
Hex 0 a b c d e f - - 
R1 L M N P Q R S Y W 
R2 H G F E D C A Y W 
R3 M N P Q R S C Y W 
 
Three different representations of the hexadecimal code in the amino acid alphabet were tried for 
alignment purposes (Table 1). The first representation (R1, 2
nd
 and 6
th
 rows of Table 1) uses the 
same order of hexadecimal to amino acid residues and is the representation used previously 
(Chen et al., 2012a; Chen et al., 2012b). The second (R2, 3
rd
 and 7
th
) reverses this order and the 
third (R3, 4
th
 and 8
th
) uses a shift of one amino acid residue after the initial residue. This resulted 
in three datasets, each of 120 instances. In all cases ‘W’ is used to represent gaps introduced in 
the first alignment of worms and viruses separately, and ‘Y’ for gaps in the second alignment of 
worms and viruses jointly (details below).  
 
Sequence alignment for multiple sequences typically performs a pair-wise alignment first and 
then uses information produced during pair-wise alignment to perform a multiple alignment. The 
same or different, or no, substitution matrices may be used during the two phases. These 
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substitution matrices reflect the effects of pre-defined biological relationships between residues 
when alignments are formed during the first and second phases.  If different amino acid 
representations are used for malware signatures, different alignments will be produced depending 
on the substitution matrix, the stage of alignment and the representation method. Substitutions 
can be weighted, however, as to their probability or likelihood given the sequences actually 
being aligned. The calculation of these weights is built into the alignment method used as default 
parameters. For instance, an alignment method that is two-phased may use the first phase to 
generate weights on residue substitutions based on complete pair-wise alignment, with these 
weights being used in a second phase global alignment for determining where to insert gaps. 
Default weighting parameters were used in all the experiments below. 
 
In this paper, ClustalW (Thompson et al., 1994) and T-Coffee (Notredame et al., 2000) are used 
in four experiments for aligning the signatures represented in the three ways described in Table 
1.  ClustalW (as provided on the EBI site), in addition to using weightings (hence the ‘W’ suffix) 
on sequences so that similar sequences are down-weighted and dissimilar sequences are 
upweighted, allows one of four substitution methods, including no substitution matrix (called the 
‘identity’ or ‘unitary’ matrix), to be used during both its initial pairwise alignment and its 
secondary multiple alignment.  The first set of alignment experiments used ClustalW with 
default parameters except for the choice of substitution matrices, which were set to unitary 
matrices (1 for a positive self-match, 0 or negative for a mismatch) for both phases of alignment. 
This results in gaps being introduced as part of the alignment but not substitutions. The second 
set of alignment experiments with ClustalW switched on the substitution matrix BLOSUM 
(Henikoff and Henikoff, 1992) that reflects highly conserved regions of existing protein families. 
The third set of experiments with ClustalW used another substitution matrix, Gonnet (Gonnet et 
al., 1992). Very generally, Gonnet matrices represent evolutionary substitution and therefore 
distance information gained from analysing all protein sequences known in 1992, whereas 
BLOSUM matrices use conservation and similarity of function information within the sequences 
being analysed. BLOSUM can lead to alignments where amino acids are blocked in appearance 
in comparison to other alignment techniques that can disperse the amino acids more widely in 
the alignment. It is well known that different substitution matrices produce different results on 
the same set of sequences reflecting different purpose (Hara et al., 2010). 
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For the fourth and final alignment experiment, T-Coffee was used with BLOSUM as the 
substitution matrix.  Default parameters are used to set gap penalties (based on an evolutionary 
model where gaps represent insertion or deletion mutations) after calculating a distance matrix 
from similarity scores for every possible pair of sequences in the first phase of alignment. T-
Coffee then adds a position-specific scoring scheme by pooling information from the first phase 
for use in the second phase of multiple alignment. FASTA format (Lipman and Pearson, 1985) 
was used as the input method for all alignments. 
 
The experimental method adopted is as follows:  
 
Initial step: Convert the 60 worm signatures into three amino acid representation datasets using 
Table 1. Call these datasets WR1-WR3 (for ‘worm representation 1’ - ‘worm representation 3’). 
Repeat for the virus signatures (‘VR1’ – ‘VR3’). Each sample in the dataset is an artificial 
polypeptide sequence consisting of amino acid letters.  
 
Step (a) Input all 60 WR1 worm polypeptide sequences into ClustalW using the unitary matrix to 
form an initial  set of aligned worm sequences (SAWCIR1, for ‘single aligned worm using 
ClustalW with Identity matrix and Representation 1’). Code gaps as ‘W’. Repeat for WR2 and 
WR3 worms, resulting in SAWCIR2 and SAWCIR3. Store the three consensuses produced by 
the multiple alignment as WCCIR1-WCCIR3, for ‘worm consensus using ClustalW with Identity 
matrix Representation 1’ to ‘worm consensus ClustalW with Identity matrix Representation 3’. 
We return to these consensus sequences in the second set of systems and methods (Section 4). 
 
Step (b) Input all 60  VR1 virus polypeptide sequences into ClustalW (unitary matrix) to form an 
initial set of aligned virus sequences. Code gaps as ‘W’. Repeat for VR2 and VR3 viruses. This 
results in three single aligned datasets SAVCWR1-SAVCWR3. Store the three consensuses 
produced by ClustalW  (VCCWR1-VCCWR3) for later use in a second set of experiments 
(Sections 4 and 5 below). 
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Step (c) Combine the two single aligned sets SAWCWR1 (worm) and SAVCWR1 (virus)  into 
one set and input into ClustalW (unitary matrix) to form a second, doubly aligned set of 
polypeptide sequences. Code all gaps introduced at this (double alignment) stage as ‘Y’. Repeat 
for R2 and R3 worm and virus singly aligned polypeptide sequences. This results in three 
datasets consisting of doubly multiply aligned worm and virus polypeptide sequences, with each 
data set containing sequences using R1, R2 and R3, respectively. Call these datasets DACIR1, 
DACIR2 and DACIR3 where ‘DA’ is ‘doubly aligned’ (i.e. combined, doubly aligned set), ‘CI’ 
is ‘ClustalW with identity/unitary matrix’ and R1-R3 are as described previously (three different 
representations using Table 1). 
 
Step (d) Repeat (a)-(c) but  with the following changes: 
(i) switch on Gonnet within ClustalW for both phases of alignment; 
(ii) switch off Gonnet and switch on BLOSUM within ClustalW for both phases of 
alignment; 
(iii) use T-Coffee and switch on BLOSUM at the final stage of multiple alignment. 
 
This results in 9 more doubly aligned datasets: DACGR1-3, where ‘CG’ is ClustalW with 
Gonnet; DACBR1-3, where ‘CB’ is ClustalW with BLOSUM; and DATBR1-3, where ‘TB’ is 
T-Coffee with BLOSUM switched on. The templates DAxyR1-DAxyz3 will be used as follows: 
x=C(lustal) or T(-Coffee); y= I(dentity) or G(onnet) or B(LOSUM). These twelve datasets will 
be input to five different symbolic machine learning techniques (details below) using their amino 
acid representations or, in the case of the perceptron, their numeric equivalents (see below). 
Table 2 (Appendix A) provides an overview of all 68  datasets generated by the initial step and 
steps (a)-(c) above. 
 
Step (e) For input to a neural network, convert all DAxyR1 – DAxyR3 datasets (twelve in total) 
from their polypeptide alphabetic representation into numeric using the replacements specified in 
Table 3.  To take into account the arbitrary nature of the conversion of amino acid residues to 
numerical values, a hidden layer of 72 units is introduced. Previous work  (Chen et al., 2012a)  
had shown that a 72-node hidden layer, in comparison to other architectures, was effective. The 
numeric conversion was also used successfully previously (Chen et al., 2012b) and is used again 
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here. A two-layer network can also deal with the input values and their mapping to the output 
value in a non-linear way. Weka perceptrons were used to implement the neural networks, which 
have as many input nodes as amino acids in the fixed length, doubly aligned polypeptide 
sequences. For Weka, each residue position was given its own attribute name defined by its 
position in the doubly aligned sequence. Finally, for supervised machine learning, a ‘0’ is affixed 
to each virus sample and a ‘1’ to each worm sample.  
 
Step (f) Test all three representations for generalizability and ability to withstand over-fitting 
across all machine learning techniques. The first condition of generalizability is implemented 
through a 66:34 training and testing regime, and the aim is to check how well the representations 
classify a relatively large proportion of unseen cases.  The second condition of ability to 
withstand over-fitting is implemented through a 10-fold training and cross-validation regime, 
with 90% of samples used for training and 10% for cross-validation. Over-fitting can occur if the 
trained classifier has problems classifying a relatively small proportion of unseen cases. Report 
overall accuracy results for each of the machine learning techniques across both test conditions. 
 
Step (g) Analyse all three representations for richness of knowledge extraction using PRISM 
(Cendrowska, 1987)  available in Weka and analyse the results for possible viral and worm meta-
signatures. Whereas previously J48 (a rule extractor with pruning) had been used (Chen et al., 
2012a), here we report on the application of PRISM (a modular rule extractor) to help compare 
the results. PRISM was used with no testing to maximise knowledge extraction (i.e. all samples 
were used for rule extraction).    
 
Table 3: Conversion of the 16 amino acid alphabet to numeric form between 0 to 1 for input to perceptrons. Y and W 
(two extra characters) represent the gaps introduced during alignment (see main text). 
 
A C D E F G H I K 
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 
L M N P Q R S Y W 
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
 
Step (h) Evaluate the datasets with the best alignment and representation, as given by the 
machine learning results, as if they are real biological sequences to check for any added value to 
supplement the machine learning results. The methods adopted for this stage are described in 
more detail in Section 4 below. 
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Aligning the 60 virus and 60 worm polypeptide sequences separately (a-b above) allows the 
conserved regions of the virus and worm sequences across families within each class to be 
independently extracted. For instance, after alignment by T-Coffee, we have (for the first parts of 
three viral polypeptide sequences using R1): 
 
FIIDIDNGLFDSRPLEEFKGALEGEI... 
GE-----SQMPSIDMPQF---PGLPS... 
---------ILHSPMHQFRF-PRSQR... 
              : :*         
which shows that only F is aligned across all three sequences (‘*’), and  M and Q across two 
sequences (“:”).  The gaps ‘-‘ introduced at this stage are coded ‘W’. When these aligned virus 
sequences are themselves aligned with their worm sequence counterpart representations, the gaps 
introduced are coded ‘Y’ (step (c) above).  Y and W have their own representation for perceptron 
input (Table 2).  
 
Four symbolic machine learning algorithms were used in addition to the (numeric) perceptron: 
Naïve Bayes, J48, LAD Tree and OneR. Naïve Bayes is a simple version of Bayesian classifiers 
that only looks at the relationship between a particular feature and classification, i.e. no attention 
is paid to combinations of features. J48, as noted earlier, is an implementation of ID3 and C4.5 
tree induction algorithms and uses information-theoretic formulae (Quinlan, 1993). The LAD 
tree algorithm is an approach using least absolute deviation (LAD) error to obtain regression 
trees that can handle discrete variables through recursive partitioning (Breiman et al., 1983). 
OneR is a single rule (one rule) classification algorithm that produces a tree of only one level, 
where the rule is a set of attributes associated with their majority class (Holte, 1993). For 
reporting the test results, the following standard formula for accuracy using numbers of samples 
in each category is adopted (virus is negative (N), worm is positive (P), true is T and false is F): 
accuracy = (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN). No attempt is made to distinguish sensitivity from 
specificity, since it is the overall effect of the representation on accuracy that is being tested.  
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3 RESULTS 1 
Benchmark classification accuracy figures were first calculated for  the non-aligned (original) 
sequences (VR1+WR1, VR2+WR2, VR3+WR3), using 66:34 training and testing ratio, and 10 
fold cross validation using 90:10:   
Naïve Bayes: 26% (66:34), 43% (90:10) 
J48: 54%, 54% 
LAD Tree: 51%, 63% 
OneR: 49%, 58% 
Perceptron: 39%, 48% 
The overall benchmark accuracy average was 44% for the 66:34 ratio and 53% for the 90:10 ten-
fold cross validation (49% overall benchmark average) for the non-aligned sequences. The 
accuracy remains the same for all three modes of representation, indicating (as expected) that 
these machine learning techniques treat the representations as context-free. These benchmark 
accuracy figures indicate that the 120 signatures, in their original hex and amino acid forms, are 
problematic from a machine learning perspective, i.e. not much better than tossing a coin. The 
multiple alignments of worms and viruses (steps (a)-(c) above) resulted in fixed length sequences 
varying in length as described in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: The effect on length of viral and worm signatures by representation (R), method (ClustalW or T-
Coffee) and substution matrix (Identity, Gonnet, BLOSUM) 
 ClustalW 
with ID 
(xy=CI) 
ClustalW 
with 
Gonnet 
(xy=CG) 
ClustalW 
with 
BLOSUM 
(xy=CB) 
T-coffee 
with 
BLOSUM 
(xy=TB) 
VIRUS–
R1 
121 91 81 223 
VIRUS-R2 116 85 79 193 
VIRUS-R3 140 85 79 212 
WORM-
R1 
129 90 87 185 
WORM-
R2 
121 87 87 202 
WORM-
R3 
116 89 84 233 
DAxyR1 494 171 103 981 
DAxyR2 440 112 106 1101 
DAxyR3 462 128 86 1284 
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There were significant differences in length by the four alignment methods (i.e. six pairwise 
comparison of the columns of Table 4, paired samples T-test, −424.68≤t≤149.68, df=8, p≤0.05). 
There was no difference between lengths by alignment method by representation (i.e. repeating 
the above paired samples T test for representation 1 only, for representation 2 only and then 
representation 3 only, 18 pairwise tests altogether).   
 
The overall results for all four symbolic algorithms and the perceptron, under the two test 
conditions (66-44 training testing, and 10-fold cross-validation), are presented in Table 5. A 
fixed learning rate of 0.2 and momentum of 0.1 were used for all 12 perceptrons (3 
representation methods x 4 alignment methods) for 200 epochs (the same as for the benchmarked 
perceptron results). One sample T tests comparing the results of each of the five ML techniques 
using aligned and combined virus and worm sequences showed significant differences 
(improvements) over the benchmark, non-aligned results (i.e. columns a-m tested against the  
original unaligned benchmark figures above column index in Table 5): 5.15≤t≤11.89, p≤0.001, 
df=11, 13 tests. There was only one significant difference between representations in terms of 
classification accuracy: J48 under the test condition 90/10 cross validation (column d of Table 5)  
between representations 1 and 3 (independent samples T test, t=2.62, df=6, p≤0.05).  There were 
some significant differences between alignment methods and specific ML classification 
accuracies (paired samples T test, df=4 in all cases, p≤0.05, row and column numbers as per 
indexes in Table 5): 
Between CG and CB (rows 2,3,7,8,12,13): perceptron 66/34 (column i), t=4.3. 
Between CG and TB (2,4,7,9,12,14): Naïve Bayes 66/34 (a), t=4.84; Naïve Bayes 90/10 
(b), t=7.2; J48 66/34 (c), t=3.28. 
Between CB and TB (3,4,8,9,13,14): Naïve Bayes 66/34 (a), t=4.35; J48 66/34 (c), 
t=3.04; OneR 90/10 (h), t=3.0. 
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Table 5: Accuracy figures for R1, R2 and R3 representations across five machine learning algorithms after 
four different methods of alignment CI, CG, CB and TB. ‘66/34’ and ‘90/10’ refer to the training, testing and 
cross-validation regimes used.  
 
 
 
There were also significant differences between some alignment methods and average 
classification accuracies in Table 5 (independent samples T Test, df=4 in all cases, p≤0.05): 
Between CG and TB (rows 2,4,7,9,12,14): Average 66/34 (k), t=4.8; Average 90/10 (l), 
t=2.69; Overall average (m), t=3.74. 
Between CB and TB (3,4,8,9,13,14): Average 66/34 (k), t=3.92; Overall average (m), 
t=2.9. 
In other words, TB appeared to have most (negative) effect on average classification accuracies 
in comparison to CG and CB.  Analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed no difference in the 
variances of the individual ML technique accuracies by representation and only three significant 
differences (p≤0.05, df=11) by alignment: Naïve Bayes 66/34, F=4.50; Naïve Bayes 90/10, 
F=5.53; and OneR 90/10, F=4.24. Post-hoc tests showed that, in the case of the first, TB had 
significantly different negative means in comparison to CG and CB only; in the case of the 
second, CI had a significantly different negative mean in comparison to CG and CB only; and 
Overall 
average
66/34 90/10 66/34 90/10 66/34 90/10 66/34 90/10 66/34 90/10 66/34 90/10
Original 
unaligned
0.26 0.43 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.63 0.49 0.58 0.39 0.48 0.44 0.53 0.49
column index a b c d e f g h i j k l m
row index R1
1 CI 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.77 0.66 0.72 0.56 0.59 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.64 0.59
2 CG 0.95 0.98 0.88 0.83 0.93 0.91 0.78 0.81 0.95 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.90
3 CB 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.82 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.87 0.84 0.86
4 TB 0.71 0.90 0.73 0.82 0.93 0.91 0.78 0.80 0.85 0.95 0.80 0.88 0.84
5 Average R1 0.76 0.85 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.80
R2
6 CI 0.63 0.64 0.73 0.65 0.71 0.72 0.51 0.64 0.71 0.58 0.66 0.65 0.65
7 CG 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.88 1.00 0.98 0.88 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
8 CB 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.96 0.96
9 TB 0.44 0.78 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.61 0.56 0.85 0.86 0.70 0.74 0.72
10 Average R2 0.76 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.74 0.79 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
R3
11 CI 0.98 0.90 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.90 0.87 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.94
12 CG 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97
13 CB 0.93 0.98 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.96
14 TB 0.59 0.87 0.78 0.80 0.76 0.82 0.76 0.71 1.00 0.94 0.78 0.83 0.80
15 Average R3 0.87 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.92
16
Average ML 
method
0.80 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.85
Naïve Bayes J48 LAD Tree OneR AveragePerceptron
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similarly for the third case. In other words, in no case were all the means within an ML technique 
significantly different from each other by alignment. Although there was no overall significant 
difference between alignment methods as a group and combined overall average, post-hoc 
ANOVA analysis showed that CI had a significantly lower mean than CG and CB (p≤0.05).  
Table 6 provides the average accuracies by alignment method to make these differences clearer. 
There were a number of other ANOVA differences significant in the range 0.051≤p≤0.1 (and 
visually identifiable in Table 6) and not reported here. In other words, CI was on the whole the 
worst performing alignment method. This may seem surprising, given that CI is the one 
alignment technique that does not use biologically plausible substitution matrices and only 
inserts gaps to help identical amino acids in different sequences to align in columns. However, 
identity matrices will work best when there is significant commonality between sequences. Their 
relatively poor performance here indicates that the sequences do not share much commonality. 
 
Table 6: Averaged alignment accuracy figures of Table 5. The underlined figures show the significant differ-
ences found through ANOVA, with figures in bold indicating the entries that these underlined figures dif-
fered significantly from. 
 
 
 
Overall, R3 performed best (0.92 overall accuracy, row 15, column m of Table 5) across all five 
ML techniques under both test conditions, irrespective of alignment method. ClustalW with 
Gonnet was the best alignment method  (0.94) across all ML techniques, irrespective of 
representation (Table 6). All accuracy results using aligned data were individually better than the 
benchmark accuracy for the non-aligned datasets. The overall accuracy of 85% (bottom right of 
Table 5) is a major improvement on the 49% accuracy for the benchmarked (non-aligned) data, 
demonstrating that the use of sequence alignment techniques can serve a useful ML purpose. 
 
To complete the first set of results, the best sequences of the three representations, as given by 
the overall accuracy figures in Table 5, were input to the rule extractor, PRISM. R1 worked best 
alignment NB 66/34 NB 90/10 J48 66/34 J48 90/10
LAD 
66/34
LAD 
90/10
OneR 
66/34
OneR 
90/10
P 66/34 P 90/10
Average 
66/34
Average 
90/10
Combined 
overall 
average
CI 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.66 0.70 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.74 0.73
CG 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.96 0.87 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.94
CB 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.93
TB 0.58 0.85 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.69 0.90 0.92 0.76 0.82 0.79
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with ClustalW using Gonnet (0.9, row 2), R2 with ClustalW using BLOSUM (0.96, row 8) and 
R3 with ClustalW using Gonnet (0.97, row 12).  All 120 doubly aligned sequences were used for 
rule extraction (i.e. no training and testing) to maximize knowledge extraction. For R1 CG 
sequences, the following rules were found (all W and Y gap representations are excluded; ‘pos’ 
refers to ‘position’ in the sequence): 
Virus: If pos36 = A, pos21 = D, pos28 = E, pos53 = A, pos20 = N, pos5 = A, pos30 = L, 
pos32 = A, pos36 = P. 
Worm: If pos72 = L, pos73 = P, 51 = H, pos59 = S, pos70 = R, pos73 = D, pos46 = R, 
pos72 = M, pos71 = S,  pos44 = I, pos45 = L, pos70 = G, pos10 = L, pos41 = C, pos45 = 
D, pos54 = L. 
Rewritten as a left to right amino acid sequence using the positional information, these rules 
produce the strings ..A..ND..E..L..A..[AP]..A.. for virus and 
..L..C..I[LD]R..H..L..S..[GR]S[LM][DP].. for worm, where ‘..’ stands for ‘any number of any 
amino acid’ and square parentheses indicated alternatives. Converting these amino acids 
sequences back to their R1 hexadecimal equivalents using Table 1 and removing the gaps 
produce the meta-signatures ‘1b3401[1c]1’ for virus and ‘028[03]e70f[6e]f[0a][3c]’ for worm.  
 
For R2 CB, rules with only gaps except for ‘worm if pos21=R’ were returned. For R3 CG, the 
following rules were found by PRISM: 
Virus: If  pos65 = F, pos12 = A, pos13 = A. 
 Worm: If pos124 = M, pos122 = A, pos124 = H, pos119 = N, pos55 = M, pos88 = M, 
pos11 = A, pos33 = I, pos55 = L.  
Rewritten as amino acid, left to right sequences, these rules produce ..AA..F.. for virus and 
..A..I..[LM]..M..N..A..[HM].. for worm, which in turn produce the hex meta-signatures ‘114’ for 
virus and ‘17[90]0a1[60]’ for worm.  
 
In other words, these meta-signatures represent those parts of the virus and worm signatures that 
are conserved between variants and families of virus and worm signatures as well as those parts 
that distinguish viral signatures from worm signatures, using R1 and R3 as the representation 
methods, ClustalW as the alignment method and Gonnet as the substitution matrix used for both 
phases of alignment within ClustalW.  
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4 SYSTEMS AND METHODS 2 
 
The results above indicate that ClustalW with Gonnet (CG) produces the most accurate 
classification results (0.94 in Table 6) as well as most interpretable and useful meta-signatures 
for data mining purposes, especially when R1 is used as the representation method. The meta-
signatures produced by PRISM using CG, namely, ‘1b3401[1c]1’ for R1 virus and 
‘028[03]e70f[6e]f[0a][3c]’ for R1 worm, and ‘114’ for R3 virus and ‘17[90]0a1[60]’ for R3 
worm, should ideally be interpreted by tracing back to the op codes in the original source code 
from which the hexadecimal signatures were initially derived. But the malware source code is 
not available in this case (due to security concerns regarding the public dissemination of malware 
code) and may not be available for other datasets where there has been a non-reversible 
transformation or conversion from the original data to that used for data mining. The aim of the 
second set of experiments is to determine the feasibility of interpreting these meta-signatures by 
reference to the biological domain. 
 
The linear representation of sequences represents the primary structure of the protein. The 
secondary structure of an amino acid sequence provides an indication of how segments can form 
a 3D structure through local interactions. The basic secondary structures are ‘helix’,  ‘coil’ ; 
‘sheet’ and ‘beta turn’, and can be calculated from the hydrogen bonds between amino acids and 
carboxyl groups. Secondary structure gives rise to tertiary structure, which is the 3D 
representation of the entire sequence determined by atomic coordinates. Many sources now exist 
that describe the relationships between these three structures and the problems associated with 
computational prediction of secondary and tertiary structure from the primary sequence.
1
 Finally, 
there is quaternary structure, which is 3D representation of a complex protein structure 
consisting of two or more functionally distinct subsequences.  
 
One way to check for interpretability is to see whether a particular representation, after 
alignment, has biological plausibility in terms of matches with real protein sequences. That is, 
the ‘most plausible representation’ can be hypothesized to be the one that maps signatures of a 
class, after initial alignment to identify commonalities across families within that class, to the 
  
1 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tertiary_structure#Tertiary_structure for an initial set of references.  
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most biological analogues, whereas the’ least plausible representation’ is one that maps to few 
biological analogues. Using a representation that has more biological plausibility may, in turn, be 
reflected in improved alignment due to the use of biologically based substitution matrices that 
reflect known frequencies of mutations and conserved subsequences of residues in existing 
protein sequences.   The first set of experiments in this section takes each of the 120 sequences in 
the singly aligned datasets using all three representations and entering them, one by one, into the 
PRINTS database as queries to see which of the existing known proteins are returned as the 
closest match between the artificial, aligned polypeptide sequence and naturally occurring 
polypeptide sequences. PRINTS (Attwood et al. 1994; Attwood et al., 2012) consists of 
conserved motifs (called ‘fingerprints’) found in already aligned proteins with known function 
and structure. Newly aligned sequences can be matched against these fingerprints to tentatively 
assign these sequences to known families of protein and hence predict the function and structure 
of these new sequences. The number of hits in the first experiment will help us determine the 
most plausible representation as given by the highest number of hits. To provide a benchmark, 
the original, unaligned sequences in all three representations were also input to PRINTS to see if 
alignment produced better results. These experiments investigate the three primary structure 
representations (R1-R3) produced by the four alignment methods in more detail.   
 
Since ClustalW with Gonnet introduces biological plausibility through the use of Gonnet 
substitution matrices, it would be useful to adopt ‘protein semantics’ as an approach to 
interpretability of results. The second set of experiments below visualizes the secondary and 
tertirary structure of the consensuses produced by ClustalW using Gonnet on R1, R2 and R3 to 
identify any biological commonalities across representation types that have been introduced by 
the biological substitution matrices. These consensuses were produced during the first phase of 
alignment (i.e. when virus signatures were aligned separately from worm signatures - steps (a) 
and (b) in Section 2)). These visual realizations may contain useful structural information to 
supplement the machine learning results. For the second set of experiments below, the six 
consensuses (WCCGR1-3, VCCGR1-3) were analyzed and only amino acids that achieved a 
threshold 15% appearance in the consensus were kept for realization. This represents a minimum 
of 9 appearances of that amino acid in a specific position in the 60 signatures after alignment by 
ClustalW using Gonnet.  Where two or more amino acids achieved this threshold for a particular 
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position in the alignment, all such amino acids were listed in the abbreviated consensus. These 
abbreviated consensuses were entered into the ab initio 3D protein modeler QUARK (Xu and 
Zhang, 2012) for secondary structure analysis and tertiary structure realization. Such ab initio 
modelers use the atomic and molecular properties of individual amino acids, irrespective of 
whether the sequence actually exists as a protein.  
 
Finally, the meta-signatures produced by PRISM and using ClustalW with Gonnet can be given 
biological meaning by calculating their secondary and tertiary structure predictions, and then 
combining them into a complex multiple protein structure. Such a quaternary structure is the 
arrangement of multiple folded proteins, where conformational changes can lead to re-orientation 
of subunits and allostery – the regulation of the complex multiple protein through binding 
effector molecules on several binding sites rather than just one.
2
 The quaternary structure of the 
meta-signatures provides ‘super-representational’ structure for both the virus and worm meta-
signatures with the binding sites differing according to the representation used.  These signatures 
can be checked against known signatures of protein families using PRINTS available at EBI. 
 
In summary, the experimental method for the second set of experiments is as follows: 
Step (i): Take the six non-aligned datasets VR1-VR3 and WR1-WR3 and find the number of hits 
against known proteins using each sequence as a fingerprint. Repeat for the singly aligned 
versions of these datasets, i.e. SAVCIR1-R3, SAWCIR1-R3, SAVCGR1-R3, SAWCGR1-R3, 
SAVCBR1-R3, SAWCBR1-R3, SAVTBR1-R3, SAWTBR1-R3 (see Table 2, Appendix A for a 
description of these datasets). Compare the results. 
Step (j): Take the six consensuses produced by ClustalW with Gonnet using all three 
representations (i.e. VCCGR1-R3 and WCCGR1-R3), apply a 15% appearance threshold to each 
member of the consensus, and input the abbreviated consensuses to QUARK for secondary and 
tertiary structure prediction and realization. Report any interesting features. 
Step k: Combine the R1 and R3 meta-signatures produced by PRISM and using ClustalW with 
Gonnet  into one long sequence and calculate the quaternary structure of these combined meta-
signatures. Check for any interesting similarities and/or differences both visually and using 
PRINTS. 
  
2 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protein_quaternary_structure for an initial introduction to quaternary structure and allostery. 
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5 RESULTS 2 
 
For the first experiment, Table 7 describes the number of hits by sequence and in total for each 
of the alignment methods, including non-alignment as a benchmark. As can be seen, TB provides 
the least biological plausibility (only one hit) and CG the most in terms of total hits against 
proteins (368) and the most number of different proteins found (349). CI was less plausible than 
the benchmarked non-aligned sequences in terms of hits on all three measures.  
 
Table 7: The number of hits against existing proteins using PRINTS before and after the first alignment. The 
rows represent the 60 signatures represented using R1-R3. The columns represent the alignment method. 
‘SC’ provides the total number of sequences out of 60 in  that particular dataset that were matched against 
existing proteins; ‘TC’ provides the total number of proteins matched by all sequences in that dataset; ‘PC’ 
provides the total number of different proteins matched by all sequences in that dataset.  
 
 
CG showed a small but interesting reduction in the number of different proteins found in 
comparison to total proteins, indicating some common hits against the same protein by different 
sequences belonging to R1 virus (from 65 to 63), R2 virus (from 93 to 85), R3 virus (from 83 to 
82) and R3 worm (from 54 to 46). Similarly, CB showed some small reductions for R1 virus 
(from 68 to 65) and R3 worm (from 46 to 44). These common hits were examined in more detail. 
 
For CB R1 virus, the common proteins were (using PDB fingerprint ID codes) 1EZV (twice), 
1KYO (twice) and 1KB9 (twice). 1EZV,1KYO and 1KYO all refer to ubiquinol-cytochrome 
reductase complex core proteins found in S. cerevisiae (bc1 complex) and play a key part in 
energy conversion of the respiratory and photosynthetic electron transfer chains (Hunte et al., 
2000).   For CB R3 worm, the common proteins were 1COV (twice) and 1JEW (twice), both of 
which are parts of the coxsackiervirus. 1COV is part of the coat (Muckelbauer et al., 1995) and 
SC TC PC SC TC PC SC TC PC SC TC PC SC TC PC
R1-virus 15 39 39 14 51 51 24 65 63 23 68 65 0 0 0
R1-worm 15 37 37 8 22 22 12 32 32 17 47 47 0 0 0
R2-virus 18 42 42 11 22 22 29 93 85 22 64 64 0 0 0
R2-worm 12 29 29 11 32 32 16 41 41 18 46 46 0 0 0
R3-virus 9 18 18 4 9 9 22 83 82 17 48 48 1 1 1
R3-worm 17 32 32 9 19 19 16 54 46 12 46 44 0 0 0
Totals 86 197 197 57 155 155 119 368 349 109 319 314 1 1 1
TBNon-aligned CI CG CB
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1JEW is a receptor (He at al., 2001). Coxsackievirus is an Entovirus, one of the most common 
human pathogens.
3
  
 
For both the CG R1 virus and CG R1 worm, the common proteins were 1PG4 (twice for R1 
virus; five times for R1 worm) and 1PG3 (twice for R1 virus; five times for R1 worm). 1PG4 
and 1PG3 are both acetyl CoA synthetases from Salmonella enterica (Gulick et al., 2003). 
Synthetases (or ligases) catalyze the joining together of two molecules.
4
 S.enterica is one of the 
most common causes of illness caused by food infection.
5
  
 
For the second experiment, the following six abbreviated signature consensuses (WCCGR1-3 
and VCCGR1-3 of Table 5) are formatted as follows: the first line is the representation and type 
identifier, with original consensus length as given in Table 4 followed by the abbreviated 
consensus length using a 15% residue commonality threshold; the second line is the abbreviated 
consensus; and third line is the secondary structure QUARK predictions (C = coil; H = helix; E = 
sheet; T =  beta turn). Options for a specific position achieving the 15% threshold are in 
parentheses. 
 
R1 virus consensus (original length 91, abbreviated length 32) :  
CCCKQCAKF[AMP]IKRCIGPCNGP[FM]CD[AG]LKC  
CHHHHHHHH[HHH]HHHTTTTCCCC[EE]ET[TT]TCC 
 
R1 worm consensus (90, 29): 
NFP[AL]NMCRMRGCHLPKCME[LM]QSHICRN 
CCH[HH]HHHHHHTTTTHHHHH[HH]HHHHHCC 
 
R2 virus consensus (85, 30):  
CRSAGFGCSSNLCRLERCS[CI]LCRRRIECI 
TTTTCCCCTTTTEEHCCCC[EE]EEEEEEECC 
 
  
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coxsackievirus 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ligase 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salmonella_enterica 
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R2 worm consensus (87,28):  
CFMFRGGCRCEGKCGCFK[DG]PFDCGPRL 
CEETTTTEETTTTTTTCT[TT]TTTTTTTC 
 
R3 virus consensus (85, 39): 
CCQLFKAFAQCCGRCGKICQLGCLRI[IL]PEQCDLM[DP]IL  
CHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHCCEEE[EC]HHHCTTT[TT]TT 
 
R3 worm consensus (89,34): 
GLCPHDMPPHLIDC[EQ]CE[FL]FDCG[FIM][DP]CPCSC 
CCTTTTCTTTTCCH[HH]TT[TT]TTTT[TTT][TT]TTCCC 
 
These consensus sequences produced the 3D tertiary structure protein models in Figures 1-6, 
with options listed (arrows represent the primary and secondary sequence order of amino acids): 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Jmol visualization of R1 CG virus consensus 
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Figure 2: Jmol visualization of R1 CG worm consensus 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Jmol visualization of R2 CG virus consensus 
 
 
Figure 4: Jmol visualization of R2 CG worm consensus 
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Figure 5: Jmol visualization of R3 CG virus consensus 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Jmol visualization of R3 CG worm consensus 
 
 
Structurally and visually, R1 virus and R1 worm abbreviated consensuses (Figures 1 and 2) ap-
pear to be distinguished by an extra beta-pleated sheet in R1 virus (yellow signifies sheets that 
can be formed by a number of amino acid beta turns). R2 virus and R2 worm (Figures 3 and 4) 
look indistinguishable once their sheets are formed. Although the consensus was formed with 
ClustalW using Gonnet, this may also reflect in protein semantic terms the lack of informative 
rules found by PRISM using R2 with ClustalW and BLOSUM. R3 virus and R3 worm are clear-
ly distinguishable through the presence of helices in R3 virus and beta-pleated sheets in R3 
worm (Figures 5 and 6). White and blue strings signify random coils and loops. The arrows pro-
vide an indication of left-to-right direction along the primary structure.  
 
For the third, and final, experiment, the meta signatures formed by PRISM using CG R1 virus 
and worm signatures (ANDELA[AP]A and LCI[LD]RHLS[GR]S[LM][DP], respectively) and 
R3 virus and worm signatures (AAF and AI[LM]MNA[HM], respectively) were conjoined and 
input to Quark (length 37). There are two ways to conjoin the four meta-signatures: R1 virus + 
R1 worm + R3 virus + R3 worm; and R1 virus + R3 virus + R1 worm + R3 worm. The former 
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(R1V+R1W+R3V+R3W)  keeps the representations together but splits the virus and worm meta-
signatures, whereas the latter (R1V+R3V+R1W+R3W) keeps the virus and worm meta-
signatures together but splits the representations. The first method produces: 
ANDELA[AP]ALCI[LD]RHLS[GR]S[LM][DP]AAFAI[LM]MNA[HM]  
and the second: 
ANDELA[AP]AAAFLCI[LD]RHLS[GR]S[LM][DP]AI[LM]MNA[HM] 
 
These two meta-signature sequences produced the quaternary structure shown in Figures 7 and 8. 
For R1V+R1W+R3V+R3W two small helices (first part of structure) are followed by a third, 
larger helix (second part), whereas for R1V+R3V+R1W+R3W only two large helices are 
formed. The first helix can be interpreted as R1V+R3V and the second as R1W+R3W. Random 
coils and loops occur in other parts.  
 
 
Figure 7: JMol visualization of R1V+R3V+R1W+R3W PRISM rules (meta-signatures) 
 
 
Figure 2: JMol visualization of R1V+R1W+R3V+R3W PRISM rules (meta-signatures) 
 
 
When R1V+R1W+RF3V+R3W was checked using PRINTS, three matches were found. With 
58% identity was Beta-lactoglobulin signature, a sequence containing a six-element fingerprint 
for a family of lipocalins that was itself formed from aligning five sequences. Lipocalins are pro-
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teins that extra-cellular proteins believed to be important for nutrient transport and control of cell 
regulation (Flower, 1996). With 55% similarity was orphan nuclear receptor NOR1 superfamily 
signature. This superfamily of nuclear hormone receptors consist of transcription regulators that 
mediate the transcription of target genes for a wide variety of functions, including embryonic 
development, cell differentiation and homeostasis.  Nuclear receptors have been implicated in 
disease such as cancer and diabetes, and those that have not yet been clearly identified with spe-
cific targets are termed ‘orphan’. In other words, NOR1 stands for a family of related nuclear 
receptors, the targets of which are not yet fully understood or known. With 50% similarity was 
B1 bradykinin receptor signature representing a family of G protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs) 
involved in, among other functions, activation of sensory fibres, cytokine release (Watson and 
Arkinstall, 1994).  
 
When the conjoined meta-signature sequence R1V+R3V+R1W+R3W was checked, several 
matches were found. With 61% similarity was Melanocortin receptor family signature, another 
member of the GPCR family. Next with 60% similarity and 57% similarity were  Beta-
lactoglobulin signature (see above) and  orphan nuclear receptor NOR1 superfamily signature 
(see above). With 54% similarity was another member of the GPCR super-family, Beta-3 adren-
ergic receptor signature. With 50% similarity and 46% were two more members of the GPCR 
super-family, B1 bradykinin receptor signature (see above) and Glycoprotein hormone receptor 
signature. With 31% similarity was Integrin A, a cell adhesion molecule family that is a signa-
ture for eight subunits found in a variety of different organisms including mouse, human and 
chick. Integrins are receptors on the surface of cells that have, as one of their functions, the trans-
fer of information from outside the cell into the cell (Hynes, 1987).  
 
 
 
6 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
 
The results of the first set of experiments show the feasibility of a bio-inspired data mining 
method for dealing with problematic machine learning data. The method of converting malware 
hexadecimal signatures to amino acid representation has been clearly demonstrated to affect 
learning and therefore the signatures extracted (Table 5). Given that there are 
20
P16 ways to 
undertake the hex-residue conversion, there is clearly much more work required to identify 
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‘optimal’ coding schemes taking into account the purposes of data mining. The disadvantage 
with R1 is that it appears to produce the longest doubly aligned sequences of all three 
representations (Table 4). But the machine learning results indicate that longer sequences lead to 
greater accuracy and that the rules derived for generating malware meta-signatures are relatively 
information rich in comparison to shorter alignments. All accuracy figures on aligned sequences 
were better than the original benchmark accuracy figures for the non-aligned sequences, 
indicating that, for this dataset, alignment leads to major improvements in classification accuracy 
(Table 5). However, amino acid representation can only code for a maximum of 20 different 
attribute values, including gaps. Continuous data or categorical data consisting of more than 18 
values (if two separate amino acids are used to represent gaps) may need to be binned to a 
maximum of 18 or 19 different values to allow sequence alignment using amino acids to be used. 
Nevertheless, the use of ClustalW with Gonnet as the substitution matrix for aligning 
problematic sequences has been shown to result in greater machine learning accuracy and this 
method may be of use with other problematic data.  
 
More work is required to determine the trade-off between doubly aligned sequence length and 
richness or usefulness of signatures extracted. In particular, further work is required to determine 
how predefined substitution matrices should be used, given that the ‘biology-free’ unitary or 
identity matrix produces the worst machine learning results (Table 6). Converting the 
hexadecimal code of viruses and worms to amino acids and then rational numbers between 0 to 1 
for input to neural networks has also been shown to be effective,  provided that the viral and 
worm sequences are doubly aligned appropriately (ClustalW with Gonnet, 0.97 accuracy, Table 
6). Overall, the first research question as to whether it is possible to use sequence techniques 
from bioinformatics to help distinguish between computer virus and worm signatures has been 
answered positively in this particular case.  
 
The results of the second set of experiments show that, once samples are represented as 
biosequences, protein modeling may offer new ways of interpreting the data and rules extracted 
by machine learning. If a ‘discriminatory’ representation is required, where the samples are the 
most dissimilar to naturally occurring proteins, R3 is the best before alignment and any 
representation using T-Coffee with BLOSUM after alignment (Table 7).  If a ‘generalizable’ 
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representation is needed, alignment using ClustalW with Gonnet gives the most hits (Table 7) for 
all three representation methods in comparison to the other alignment methods. Both ClustalW 
with Gonnet and ClustalW with BLOSUM returned hits of aligned sequences against a small 
number of naturally occurring ‘dangerous’ proteins, i.e. proteins associated with infection. This 
could be coincidence or it could show some implicit relationship between the substitution 
matrices used for alignment and their construction from bacterial and viral databases in the past. 
Further work is required to determine whether more can be made of such implicit relationships 
or whether some fundamental sharing of structural information between natural infection agents 
and artificial infection agents is at play here.  
 
When the consensuses returned after the first alignment using ClustalW with Gonnet are given 
3D ab initio realization, R1 (Figures 1 and 2) and R3 (Figures 5 and 6) produce models that most 
clearly distinguish between virus signature and worm signature consensuses, especially R3.  The 
functional difference between a virus and a worm (the former requires human action, the latter 
self-propagates) can, for R3,  be hypothesized to be biologically realized in the helical structure 
of virus signature consensus (Figure 5) in comparison to the sheeted structure of the worm 
signature consensus (Figure 6), for example.   
 
When the rules for distinguishing between virus and worm signatures and extracted by PRISM  
from the doubly aligned sequences using R1 and R3 with ClustalW with Gonnet were given two 
forms of ab initio realization, almost identical meta-signature protein structures were produced 
(Figures 7 and 8), indicating that these meta-signatures share some fundamental properties 
despite their consensus differences. That is, the structures shown in Figures 7 and 8 provide a 
potential novel way to look at malware signatures irrespective of representation used. Some 
evidence for this comes from checking the meta-signature sequences against existing proteins, 
with matches found against GPCRs and Integrin A family signatures. GPCRs have been linked 
to cancer and metastasis (Dorsam and Gutkind, 2007). It is possible that further work will allow 
more explicit linkages to be made between uncontrolled growth of copies of mutant programs 
through malware infection and uncontrolled growth and spread of mutant copies of tumorous 
cells. Integrin also covers a family of proteins that adhere to cells and allow the transfer of 
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information into and outside the cell. Adhesion to cells may be related to malware attaching itself 
to programs or email.   
 
Finally, the experiments reported here contribute observations to the nascent area of malware 
theory. The fundamental theoretical question is whether there exists an algorithm that can take an 
arbitrary program and determine whether that program contains malware. Despite our experience 
and understanding of malware over the last 10 years, this is a surprisingly difficult theoretical 
question to answer for a number of reasons: getting hold of malware source code and uncertainty 
as to whether all the different types of malware logic have been identified are just two. More 
interestingly, malware often blurs the relationship between data and program. Parts of a program 
that look like data can be used to hide executable code. This complicates our understanding, 
from a theoretical computing perspective, of what counts as a ‘program’ in malware terms. Any 
new science or theory needs to be based on systematic observations of relevant phenomena so 
that theory development can be guided by evidence and data.  The systematic experimentation 
described here has produced results using standard techniques that have a long history in 
bioinformatics and data mining, but these techniques can be effective if combined in novel ways 
to produce data relevant and useful for a possibly new area of computing and data mining called 
‘bio-inspired malware detection’. For instance, if more work is undertaken to build a library of 
3D biologically-realized signatures of computer viruses and worms using the techniques 
described in this paper, it may be possible to construct an algorithm that identifies malware not 
just through text pattern matching of hexadecimal code but also through comparison conserved 
regions against known malware structures stored in databases in primary, secondary, tertiary and 
quaternary forms. Also, if it is shown that such malware structures share deep functional 
relationships with naturally occurring counterparts, biological knowledge could be adapted of 
how to stop, for example, adhesion or uncontrolled growth to inspire novel theoretical advances 
in our understanding of how to deal with computer malware detection and prevention. 
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Appendix A. Table 2: Overview of datasets produced by systems and methods 
 
Method Dataset Description Number
60 virus signatures Original hexadecimal signatures 1
60 worm signatures Original hexadecimal signatures 1
Initial step VR1-VR3
Original 60 virus hexadecimal signatures converted into amino acid 
representations 1-3 (Table 1)
3
Initial step WR1-WR3
Original 60 worm hexadecimal signatures converted into amino acid 
representations 1-3 (Table 1)
3
Step (a) SAWCIR1-SAWCIR3
Single aligned worm signatures using ClustalW, Identity matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (b) SAVCIR1-SAVCIR3
Single aligned virus signatures  using ClustalW, Identity matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (a) SAWCGR1-SAWCGR3
Single aligned worm signatures  using ClustalW, Gonnet matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (b) SAVCGR1-SAVCGR3
Single aligned virus signatures  using ClustalW, Gonnet matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (a) SAWCBR1-SAWCBR3
Single aligned worm signatures  using ClustalW, BLOSUM matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (b) SAVCBR1-SAVCBR3
Single aligned virus signatures  using ClustalW, BLOSUM matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (a) SAWTBR1-SAWTBR3
Single aligned worm signatures  using T-Coffee, BLOSUM matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (b) SAVTBR1-SAVTBR3
Single aligned virus signatures  using T-Coffee, BLOSUM matrix and 
Representations 1-3
3
Step (a) WCCIR1-WCCIR3 Worm consensus using ClustalW, Identity matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (b) VCCIR1-VCCIR3 Virus consensus using ClustalW, Identity matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (a) WCCGR1-WCGIR3 Worm consensus using ClustalW, Gonnet  matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (b) VCCGR1-VCCGR3 Virus consensus using ClustalW, Gonnet  matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (a) WCCBR1-WCCBR3 Worm consensus using ClustalW, BLOSUM  matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (b) VCCIR1-VCCIR3 Virus consensus using ClustalW, BLOSUM  matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (a) WCTBR1-WCTBR3 Worm consensus using T-Coffee, BLOSUM  matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (b) VCTBR1-VCTBR3 Virus consensus using T-Coffee, BLOSUM  matrix and Representations 1-3 3
Step (c) DACIR1-DACIR3
Doubly aligned worm and virus signatures using Clustal, Identity matrix 
and Representations 1-3 (i.e. aligning SAWCIR1 with SAVCIR1, SAWCIR2 
with SAVCIR2, SAWCIR3 with SAVCIR3)
3
Step (c) DACGR1-DACGR3
Doubly aligned worm and virus signatures using Clustal, Gonnet matrix 
and Representations 1-3 (i.e. aligning SAWCGR1 with SAVCGR1, etc., see 
above)
3
Step (c) DACBR1-DACBR3
Doubly aligned worm and virus signatures using Clustal, BLOSUM matrix 
and Representations 1-3 (i.e. aligning SAWCBR1 with SAVCBR1, etc., see 
above)
3
Step (c) DATBR1-DATBR3
Doubly aligned worm and virus signatures using T-Coffee,  BLOSUM matrix 
and Representations 1-3 (i.e. aligning SAWTBR1 with SAVTBR1, etc., see 
above)
3
Total number of 
datasets
68
